

CAPACITY MARKETS AND CAPACITY VALUE

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What Is the Reliability Problem?

- Traditional View - Shortage of Energy
 - Inelastic demand, need sufficient generation
 - Political constraints on load shedding
 - Political constraints on price spikes
 - Capacity subsidies as ad hoc solution
- Glosses over the Temporal Issues
 - Enough capacity when needed


One Market or Many?

- Is Reliability Just an Energy Shortage?
 - Frequency control, too little OR too much
 - Timing is everything, no storage (for now)
- Won't Prices Solve Everything?
 - Volatile, Unpredictable Prices change quickly
 - Lag time in recognition
 - Lag time in response
 - Enough fast response resources?
- Practice v Theory – NERC Rules, etc.

Short Run to Long Run

- Planning Reserve v Operating Reserves
- A series of short-runs
 - Regulation (4 seconds), 5 Min ramp
 - 10 Minute Spinning Reserves / Nonspin
 - 30 Minute Nonspin
 - Hour ahead? Day-ahead? Emergency?
- Energy + Operating Reserves needed for minimum reliability
- Handle forced outages and Forecast Errors

Required Amount of Capacity




The Traditional Model

- Regulator Sets Reserve Margin
 - Integrated Utility
 - Generator (now includes DSM) IRP
 - Balance investment cost, operating cost, reliability – VOLL, once in ten years
 - Utility has economic incentive to optimize mix
- Goldplating and the Blame Game
 - Avery-Johnson, CEO self-interest and bias by regulators
 - Guess wrong and who gets blamed?


Brave New World of Wholesale Markets

- Price Caps Means “Missing Money”
 - Political constraints on high prices
 - Insufficient revenue for new generation
- Pay For Capacity
 - Installed Capacity (ICAP) Markets
 - Payment based on cost of new CT
 - In practice, binary results, \$0 or near cap
 - Paying all capacity the same

The Traditional View – Price Solves Everything



Price Gap Due to Price Cap



New Fangled Capacity Markets

- ISO-NE, FCM
 - Pay for capacity in future
 - DR, LM, EE included in the auction
 - Also have future reserve auction
 - Still capped by CT cost
- PJM, RPM
 - Initially generation and DR
 - FERC has ordered EE to be included

ERCOT Energy Only Market

- ERCOT, based on Australian NEM
 - 60% of capacity owned by state in Aus
 - Texas is most deregulated retail market
- Has it worked?
- Margins > 14%
 - Partially due to lower growth
 - Coal, Nuclear, Brownfield CCs, a few CTs
- Older NG units reaching end of lives
 - Concern about right mix of generation

Short-run v Long-Run

- Why are capacity revenues below cost of CT?
 - IMM Reports in every market, almost every year
 - Price caps, regulatory pressure
 - Where are the capacity shortages?
- Capacity markets are Short-run markets
 - Generation decisions long-term, driven by projections of fuel costs
 - Capacity markets 1-5 years, can't finance new units, can retain old units

RELIABILITY AS “QUALITY” AND QUANTITY

- Energy and Reliability Not the Same Market
 - Many markets are closely linked
 - Enough energy, without control, insufficient
 - Frequency control has separate value
 - VOLL
 - Capacity ~ Reliability?

Different Resources with Different Capabilities

- Total cost, including increased probability of repairs and catastrophic failure
- Base-load units have high cost of cycling, large lost opportunity cost of energy sales
- CCs often with CTs with 1.5 hour ramp
- CTs that can ramp in 10 minutes cost more
- DR Resource also have wide range of costs and capabilities
 - Control, monitoring, legal assurance
 - DR is not the same as LM and EE

Investment Decisions – Base Load Units

- Based on projected fuel and market price plus risk
 - IPP boom of 2000 based on low NG
 - Nuclear, coal based on high NG
 - Capacity markets play limited role:
 - 8000 hrs x margin - \$40/kW = \$5/MWh = 50¢/MCF
- Asymmetric risk
 - Over-investment leads to low market prices
 - Under-investment costs short-run opportunity
 - Risk of changes in technology, fuel costs
 - Difficult to site in many regions
- Regulatory Risk for Coal & Nuclear

Investment Decisions – “Reliability Units”

- CTs based on peak prices and expected AS revenues
 - Few hours with high prices – hard to recover capital
 - Units may struggle to be eligible in AS markets
- Physical Hedge?
 - Directly finance by Load or long-term contract
 - Load has alternative hedge strategies
- Older plants (sunk costs) move up the stack
 - Operating costs paid by AS as well as Energy
 - Drive down capacity markets prices
 - Leave market when major investment required

Right Mix of Resources Required

- Capacity/ Energy Only Market – Sub-optimal Mix
 - Have to overpay base load to finance peakers/DR
 - Excessive base load generation drives down price
- Ancillary Service Markets – Pay for Service, not Steel
 - Pay for the Desired Attributes
 - Ramping capacity
 - Response time
 - Energy market sets opportunity cost for AS markets
 - Cap energy price, squeeze AS markets
 - What is efficient size of Reserve Markets?

CONCLUSION

- Perfect World, Price Signals Would Control
 - Requires consumers see and respond to prices
 - Capital intensive industries over and undershoot, years of low reliability? Acceptable?
 - Requires market allocating shortages – politics
- Politics Limit Market Forces
 - Market mistakes have major social repercussions, price and blackouts
 - Inventories buffer most markets, but not electricity
 - Regulators respond to current pressure

CONCLUSION

- “Third-best” World
 - All electricity markets are “ad hoc”
 - Market signals have value, but what signals? What Markets?
- Energy market and Reliability markets
 - Energy market is the core
 - Reliability markets are “insurance” markets
 - Socialize the risk, spillovers
 - Reliability services, not dumb capacity